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a b s t r a c t 
We analyze the transmission of shocks between global banking, domestic banking and the non-financial 
sector for eleven Eurozone countries. Using a Markov-switching Factor augmented VAR model, we dis- 
tinguish between contagion, interdependence and decoupling as shock transmission mechanisms during 
the ‘crisis’ regime. Contagion played a role in propagating global banking shocks to the banking sectors of 
smaller states, exacerbating the crisis in these countries. In contrast, the non-financial sectors suffered lit- 
tle contagion from either external or domestic banking shocks, and generally managed to decouple from 
the banking industry – indicative of being able to source alternative financing and shield themselves from 
the crisis. However, shocks originating in the non-financial sector trigger contagious effects for both the 
domestic banking sector and, to a lesser extent global banking, thereby acting as a source of fragility for 
the financial sector during crisis periods. 
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
Recently, numerous Eurozone countries have suffered crises in
heir banking sectors, with these problems contributing to financial
nd economic downturns in many countries. 1 We focus on the ex-
ent to which banking shocks affected non-financial corporations
NFCs) in Eurozone countries during 2004–2015 and how shocks
riginating in the NFC sector affected the banking industry. In par-
icular, we analyze the stability of the transmission of banking –
lobal and domestic – shocks to the domestic NFC sector between
normal’ and ‘crisis’ market conditions, while allowing for potential
eedback effects. During the crisis, we distinguish between shock
ransmission that could be anticipated from pre-existing linkages
interdependence) and transmissions that were either more intense
contagion) or dampened (decoupling) relative to the pre-crisis
eriod. We include both transmissions coming from the banking
ector in reducing credit availability to the non-financial sector,
nd the potential that shocks in the non-financial sector can lead
o fragility in the banking network as in Acemoglu et al. (2015) .he accurate characterization of the transmission mechanism is 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: Mardi.Dungey@utas.edu.au (M. Dungey), thomas.flavin@mu.ie 
T.J. Flavin), dlagoa@udc.es (D. Lagoa-Varela). 
1 Laeven and Valencia (2013a) present estimates of the financial and output costs 
f the banking crisis over the period 2008-11 (Table A1, pp. 254–59). There is great 
ariation across Eurozone countries, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
ll suffering badly. 
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378-4266/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010  critical issue for both investors and policy makers. It will im-
act the effectiveness of investors’ diversification strategies, while
olicy makers must design appropriate responses to alleviate the
pread of banking distress to the non-financial sector and to over-
ome the ‘robust–but–fragile’ elements of banking networks which
ake them vulnerable to amplified transmission in response to
nusually large or unusually coincidental shocks from the non-
nancial sector. The appropriate policy responses will depend on
he sources and propagation mechanism of the shocks. 
We develop a Markov-switching factor-augmented vector au-
oregression (MS-FAVAR) model to incorporate the possibility of
hock transmission to domestic non-financial firms from either the
omestic banking sector or turmoil in global banking, and to al-
ow feedback effects where NFC shocks may impact on the bank-
ng sector. The model allows us to assess the stability of shock
ransmission across low- and high- volatility regimes and to dis-
inguish between three possible types of transmission. Contagion
epresents an increase in intensity of shock transmission during
eriods of high volatility ( Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 ). Decoupling
epresents the case when shock transmission becomes less intense
uring periods of stress ( Korinek et al., 2010 ). Finally, interdepen-
ence is when the usually observed linkages between the sectorsous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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e  are unchanged between calm and crisis periods, after accounting
for the fact that correlations change with volatility conditions. 2 
Our study is motivated by three strands of literature; namely
the effects of banking crises on the real economy, the effects of real
economy events on the banking sector, and contagion in financial
markets. The seminal work of Bernanke (1983) shows that bank-
ing crashes may accentuate downturns in the real economy and
lead to, or prolong, economic recessions. 3 Economic downturns
are, in turn, likely to affect NFCs and their stock prices. Tong and
Wei (2009) identify two channels – finance and demand – through
which a banking crisis can spread to NFCs; the finance channel
refers to external funding problems, while the demand channel
arises due to lower consumption in a recession. The finance chan-
nel is predominantly associated with credit flow disturbances dur-
ing a banking crisis. These have been shown to have real economic
effects (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1985 ) with credit restrictions ad-
versely affecting NFCs that are unable to substitute bank loans for
other forms of external financing ( Peek et al., 2003 and Laeven and
Valencia, 2013b , among others). However, Adrian et al. (2012) find
that during the recent crisis, U.S. firms could source direct debt
funding on the bond market to compensate for the reduction in
intermediated bank loans: the adverse effects of the crisis were
driven by a general jump in risk premiums rather than bank loan
restrictions. 
Unanticipated shocks to real economy firms can directly affect
the banking sector which provides them with credit services by
reducing bank balance sheet assets to an extent which impairs
their ability to service their liabilities. The network of relation-
ships between banks, either domestic or global, may be sufficient
to compensate for these shocks most of the time, that is it is ro-
bust. However, Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that when real econ-
omy firm shocks are large enough, or coincidental enough, they
can be sufficient to trigger a cascade of failures across the banking
sector, resulting in an overall banking network which is ‘robust–
but–fragile’. For this reason, our modeling framework specifically
incorporates the potential for shocks to flow not only from bank-
ing to the real economy but also from the real economy firms to
banks. As we deal with publicly-listed firms in our empirical appli-
cation it is reasonable to assume that the NFCs are relatively large,
and may reasonably be held not only by the domestic banks in
their jurisdiction but also directly by global banks, as well as indi-
rectly through the exposure of global banks to the relevant domes-
tic banks. 
Our third contribution is in the detection of financial mar-
ket contagion or shock transmission associated with a banking
crisis. Due to the highly integrated nature of the international
banking industry, (see Bekaert et al., 2009 ), the existing litera-
ture focuses on the international transmission of banking shocks.
Contagion is a debated term, but we adopt the convention here
that it distinguishes between ‘normal’ levels of asset interdepen-
dence and those that are excessive or unpredictable during a cri-
sis period (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2014;
Caporin et al., 2018 ). There is substantial evidence for the exis-
tence of widespread contagion across international banking mar-
kets following the US banking crisis of 2008 (see Dungey and
Gajurel, 2015; Fry-McKibbin and Hsaio, 2015; Gropp et al., 2009 ).
Despite evidence of contagion between international banks, rela-
tively little attention has been afforded to the propagation of bank-2 Failure to account for these changes may mask interdependence, resulting in 
the over-detection of either contagion or decoupling, a point made by a substantive 
literature beginning with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . 
3 A voluminous literature exists on the relationship between banking crises and 
economic growth. We do not attempt to review this literature here but the reader 
is referred to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Dwyer et al. (2013) for reviews and 
alternative views. 
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Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ng shocks to other sectors of the stock market. 4 Exceptions are
ekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey and Renault (2018) . The former
ests for contagion from a U.S. factor, a global financial factor and a
omestic factor to a range of country and industry portfolios. They
nd widespread evidence of contagion, with the domestic factor
utweighing the other factors as the main source of contagion for
any regions and industries. The latter analyze the transmission of
anking shocks to a number of selected sectoral indices within the
.S. and find mixed evidence of contagion. 
Contagion can accelerate and worsen the economic implications
f a crisis period, for example via the so-called ‘diabolical loop’ of
runnemeier et al. (2016) where falling equity prices can lead to
ank recapitalization programs funded by sovereign debt, which in
urn reduces the expected future value of the sovereign debt. Other
echanisms to affect the real economy include asset fire sales, a
eduction in lending due to higher capital requirements and in-
reasing risk premia in interbank markets. These factors reinforce
ach other and precipitate a negative downward spiral in the value
f banks. 
Using the MS-FAVAR model for eleven Eurozone countries we
how that shock transmission is often unstable across low- and
igh-volatility regimes but patterns of contagion, interdependence
nd decoupling vary by the pair of markets analyzed. As in the
xisting literature we find that calm and crisis regimes are per-
istent and well-identified (see Bialkowski and Serwa, 2005 ). The
risis and non-crisis regime-specific generalized impulse response
unctions (GIRFs) suggest that, for many countries, there is a more
ntensive shock transmission during a crisis (contagion) from the
lobal banking factor to the domestic banking sector, especially for
maller countries. However, decoupling is also observed for a small
umber of countries, implying that some domestic banks could
artially offset the global shock and thus fared better than antici-
ated. 
The transmission of shocks originating in domestic banks to the
lobal banking sector is largely unaltered between non-crisis and
risis periods. In this sense the banking sector is robust to the
hocks generated within individual country sectors, but the do-
estic banking sectors are more fragile to shocks originated in the
lobal banking sector. 
The NFC sector does not seem to suffer contagion from either
he global or domestic banking sector during periods of stress. In
ost cases the evidence suggests that NFCs actually decouple, that
s their exposure to banking shocks is reduced in the crisis period
ompared with the non-crisis period. This could imply that our
rms are able to access alternative sources of credit during these
eriods. Thus, NFCs provided a shield to the real economy from
he full force of the banking shock and a partial hedge to equity
nvestors whose portfolios were mainly domestically held; see also
ungey et al. (2018) for the US. The NFCs are, as hypothesised by
cemoglu et al. (2015) , a statistically discernible source of shocks
hat promote contagion to both the domestic and global banking
etwork during periods of crisis. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some the-
retical foundations for contagion and decoupling and outlines our
estable hypothesis. Section 3 describes the econometric methodol-
gy and how contagion / decoupling is detected in this framework.
ection 4 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Our
mpirical results are discussed in Section 5 , with robustness checks
eported in Section 6 . Finally, Section 7 contains our conclusions
nd a discussion of how our results may influence regulation and
olicy. 4 Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) look at the crisis transmission from U.S. to 
uropean financials and U.S. to European non-financials. However, they do not look 
t the cross-sectoral effects. 
ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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5 Switching between the regimes may also be based on variables such 
as time, the VIX or occurrence of jumps as in Dungey et al. (2015) and 
Konermann et al. (2017) . We undertook robustness to this approach and find that 
the switching times we identify are basically unchanged. We also find that the 
lagged US return is a statistically insignificant transition variable while time is sta- 
tistically significant but economically insignificant. Consequently, we remain with 
the constant coefficient regime shift model described here. Details are available on 
request. 
6 This may change for different asset classes. For example, assets who act as safe 
havens during a crisis would be expected to have much more risk / return realiza- 
tions in state IV. . Theoretical foundations and empirical implementation 
Financial market contagion is often defined as an unanticipated
isruption to cross-market relationships during a financial crisis
nd it usually intensifies the spread of a negative shock from
ts source to other connected markets, (see Forbes and Rigobon,
0 02; Dungey et al., 20 05; Gravelle et al., 20 06 ; and Flavin and
heenan, 2015 among others). The extant literature on financial
etworks provides a theoretical underpinning for this definition of
ontagion. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show how credit-constrained
rms may be forced to sell assets to unconstrained firms, result-
ng in falling asset prices. Asset price declines further impinge on
heir ability to access credit markets, creating a strong link be-
ween credit restrictions and asset prices. This transmission mech-
nism has the potential to generate negative consequences for the
on-financial sector, especially firms that are dependent on exter-
al financing. More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2015) shows how in-
tability may arise where counterparty risk in a highly-integrated
etwork, like the global banking system, can cause different be-
avior beyond some threshold level of either the number or mag-
itude of shocks. Properties of the network that act as shock ab-
orbers in ‘normal’ times, can actually make the system vulnera-
le to contagion and systemic risk in ‘crisis’ periods, resulting in
 ‘robust–but–fragile’ network. Other theoretical contributions use
ifferent triggers but also demonstrate how contagion may result
ue to the inter-connectedness of the banking industry (see Allen
nd Gale, 20 0 0; Allen et al., 2012 ; and Elliot et al., 2014 among
thers). 
Korinek et al. (2010) illustrate how contagion and decoupling
ay occur during a crisis. In their model, there are three sectors;
wo NFCs and one financial. The initial shock occurs in a non-
anking sector and the bank acts as a transmitter of the shock.
f the shock is below a threshold, the bank suffers some losses and
tops credit to the affected sector but continues to supply credit to
he other. This causes the two NFC sectors to decouple. However, if
he shock is above the threshold, the bank may become sufficiently
mpaired as to restrict credit to both NFCs, thus resulting in conta-
ion between these sectors. This idea can be generalized to shocks
hat originate in global and domestic banks and potentially alters
heir relationship with NFCs. 
Since theoretical models imply that contagion / decoupling re-
ult in multiple equilibria, regime-switching models provide an
deal empirical framework within which to analyse the stability of
he propagation of shocks from a source market to related markets.
Our framework fits within the literature on crises and contagion
easurement that tests for changes in the transmission mecha-
isms between assets during periods of calm and stress. In this
pproach the framework is to test whether the propagation of
hocks between assets remains the same in periods of high volatil-
ty (stress) as in low volatility (calm). An alternative approach is
o distinguish the transmission effect in observations in the tail of
he distributions from those within other parts of the distribution,
ssentially implying a non-linearity in the transmission of informa-
ion based on the size of the information shock. Examples include
he quantile regression approach of Caporin et al. (2018) ; compar-
sons of copulas in Busetti and Harvey (2011) ; co-exceedances in
ae et al. (2003) ; and outliers in Favero and Giavazzi (2002) . The
S approach implemented here applies to the change in trans-
ission across the distribution of returns, but allows for relatively
hort crisis periods, capturing some degree of non-linearity. This is
 major advantage of this alternative approach. 
A key decision in detecting contagion is in distinguishing the
on-crisis and crisis periods, for which three main methods ex-
st. The most common is the use of event based criteria, such
s the collapse of a market or a market intervention, though
t may be difficult to find a consensus on the exact start andPlease cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 nd dates. For example, Dungey et al. (2015) document 22 pub-
ished identifications of the global financial crisis sample. An al-
ernative is to use a two-step process to identify subsamples via
tructural break tests or tests for outliers. Using different meth-
ds, this approach is adopted by Contessi et al. (2014), Dungey
nd Gajurel (2015), Kallberg et al. (2005), Boyson et al. (2010) ,
nd Pasquariello (2008) . Finally, a few papers endeavour to, si-
ultaneously, identify the sample regimes and test for contagion.
latt et al. (2015) propose an ingenious iterative procedure, based
n a VAR, which iterates through structural break points to ob-
ain the best fit of regimes and breaks. Most of the other papers,
n this category, use a regime-switching framework. For example,
ungey et al. (2015) use a smooth transition VAR but find that
n practice the transition is very abrupt, while MS models based
n volatility regimes are employed in Jeanne and Masson (20 0 0),
ravelle et al. (2006), Flavin and Panopoulou (2009), Flavin and
heenan (2015) and Konermann et al. (2017) . Our paper fits in this
nal group. 
When searching for contagion and crisis effects switching mod-
ls usually differentiate between two main volatility states: low
representing calm markets) and high (representing stress). That is,
he switching variable is based on a form of volatility measure. 5 A
mall number of studies allow the mean and variance processes to
ndependently change regimes, e.g. Bialkowski and Serwa (2005),
ialkowski et al. (2006) , and Blatt et al. (2015) . If the mean and
ariance regimes switch at different times, then using the nota-
ion + /- for the mean states and L(H) for the low(high) volatility
tate, we can consider four possible states: 
I. Positive mean returns and low risk ( + ,L); 
II. Negative mean returns and high risk (-,H); 
III. Negative mean returns and low risk (-,L); and 
IV. Positive mean returns and high risk ( + ,H). 
In studies of equity returns, scenarios I and II are most often
ound to characterise stock return behavior during ‘normal’ and
crisis’ conditions. Scenarios III and IV are expected to be rela-
ively short-lived. 6 This hypothesis is confirmed, in the Markov-
witching literature, by Bialkowski and Serwa (2005) who estimate
ully flexible mean- and volatility-switching regimes, and find that
he equivalent of regimes I and II are very persistent in the Asian
risis (whereas III and IV are fleeting); see also Bialkowski et al.
2006) for additional European evidence. An implementation of
his outcome can be found in Konermann et al. (2017) who speci-
es one mean return for all high volatility periods and one for all
alm periods, that is case I and III are combined as are case II and
V. We also follow this approach. 
With two volatility regimes, which we label as ‘normal’ and
crisis’, we compare the responses of the recipient market to a par-
icular shock across these regimes. The transmission of a shock
uring ‘normal’ market conditions captures their interdependence
nd represents their ‘normal’ linkages. If this transmission is sta-
le (i.e. not statistically significantly different) between regimes,
hen we conclude that the market co-movements during the cri-
is period are driven by market interdependence and the propa-
ation of the shock could have been anticipated from the relation-ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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 ship during ‘normal’ market conditions. Contagion is defined as the
intensification of this transmission mechanism during a crisis pe-
riod, i.e. where the shock generates a stronger response in the re-
cipient market than that predicted by ‘normal’ levels of interde-
pendence. 7 On the other hand, if the transmission is dampened in
the crisis regime (the response is statistically significantly lower
than expected given market interdependence), this is decoupling. 8 
Hence, our empirical tests focus on the change in the response of
one market following a shock to another during the high-volatility
regime relative to the low-volatility regime. Our hypothesis can be
summarised as follows: 
H o : No statistical difference in the response across regimes, i.e.
interdependence; 
H 1a : The response intensifies in the high-volatility regime, i.e.
contagion; 
H 1b : The response is lower in the high-volatility regime, i.e. de-
coupling. 
3. Econometric methodology 
We adopt a Markov-switching factor-augmented vector autore-
gression (MS-FAVAR) model to conduct our analysis. The FAVAR
model was first introduced by Bernanke et al. (2005) to overcome
problems of dimensionality encountered in empirical models of
monetary policy and has more recently been applied to issues of
spillover and contagion in financial markets by de Bandt and Ma-
lik (2010) and Claeys and Vasicek (2014) . In our application, the
factor is extracted from a broad range of shocks to international
banking stock indices and is used as a proxy for global conditions.
This model is well suited to addressing our question as it allows
us to parsimoniously distinguish between the potential sources of
instability arising from external and internal banking conditions. 
We incorporate the FAVAR within a Markov-switching approach
and generate regime-dependent GIRFs (see Ehrmann et al., 2003 )
to study the stability of the shock transmission between regimes.
First, we extract the common shock. Second, we examine the ev-
idence for contagion between the common shock, the remaining
domestic banking shock and the non-financial company shocks for
each country using standard correlation based contagion tests. Fi-
nally, we implement an MS-FAVAR specification that allows classi-
fication of non-contiguous time periods into calm and crisis states,
and use this to generate GIRFs which detect contagion / decoupling
by comparing the changing dynamics of shock propagation across
different regimes. We discuss each stage in greater detail below. 
3.1. Extracting the common factor 
To detect contagion between the banking and the domestic
non-financial sectors, we must first properly disentangle external
and domestic banking shocks. Given the turmoil across the inter-
national banking sector during the period, this is crucial so as not
to overestimate the spillover to the non-financial sector from the
domestic banking sector. Ideally, we would include all the relevant
external shocks but the dimensionality of the model will not al-
low this, so to overcome this problem we use a common factor
to proxy for global conditions. In our analysis of country i , we ex-
tract a common shock from the banking returns of the other ten
Eurozone countries plus the UK and the US. The US and the UK7 Usually the literature defines contagion as having immediate or contempora- 
neous effects. For exam ple, Kaminsky et al. (2003) distinguish between ‘fast and 
furious’ contagion and more gradual ‘spillovers’. 
8 Some studies (e.g. Dungey and Gajurel, 2015 ) do not differentiate between more 
and less intense responses in the recipient market, but label all statistically signifi- 
cant deviations from ‘interdependence’ as contagion. 
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Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 re included as they both suffered major shocks to their banking
ndustries and contributed significantly to the widespread turmoil
xperienced by the sector. To capture the shock component of the
eturns, we first run a standard VAR model of the returns and re-
rieve the vector of residuals. We then perform a principal com-
onents based factor analysis of the correlation matrix of residu-
ls and use the first principal component as our common external
hock. 
.2. Correlation based tests 
The existing literature often checks for contagion, via various
orms of correlation coefficients, under the null of interdepen-
ence, i.e. there is no change in the propagation of a shock from
ne asset to another during periods of calm and crisis. To illustrate,
onsider the relationship between two (zero-mean) characteristics
mean or variance) denoted as x and y over different states of the
nancial market, t 1 and t 2 . 
 t1 = β1 x t1 + ε t1 
 t2 = β2 x t2 + ε t2 . 
The test for no contagion is given by H 0 : β1 = β2 . An intu-
tively appealing form of this test is via correlation coefficients
ecognizing that βi = ρi σyi σ−1 xi where σ yi and σ xi ( i = 1,2) are
he variances of the two assets under consideration. Forbes and
igobon (2002) show that a test based on H 0 : ρ1 = ρ2 is unreli-
ble when asset volatilities change between periods t 1 and t 2 ex-
ept under very special circumstances (which are unlikely to be
et). To overcome this they propose a correction based on scaling
2 by the relative change in volatility. This corrected test dramat-
cally decreases the incidence of contagion evident in the data in
oth their paper and many subsequent applications. However, sub-
equent papers have shown that the Forbes and Rigobon (FR) cor-
ection is over zealous, and results in over-acceptance of the null of
o contagion, (see Corsetti et al., 2005 ). Dungey et al. (2005) pro-
ose a regression based approach (DFGM) to implement the FR
orrection with improved statistical properties, in which the data
or t 2 are directly scaled by the change in volatility, making it pos-
ible to estimate β2 after controlling for this distortion. 
9 Each of
hese methods, however, implicitly relies on the assumption that
he relative volatility of the asset shocks, σyi σ
−1 
xi 
, remains constant
cross states. 
Instead, Dungey and Renault (2018) demonstrates that the
ropagation parameter is more correctly specified as a combina-
ion of a constant propagation and the effect of the changing rela-
ive volatilities as follows: 
i = αb i + ( 1 − α) σyi σ−1 xi 
here b i is the true parameter of interest in assessing changes in
ropagation, and α is a scaling parameter which turns out to be
nnocuous in testing. Taking into account the potential change in
elative asset volatilities, Dungey and Renault (2018) demonstrate
hat there may be substantial changes to the detection of the pres-
nce of contagion, and that there is no clear indication a priori of
he direction or extent of under- or over-detection. 
As a benchmark for our results, we implement each of the
ncorrected Forbes and Rigobon (FRN) and corrected Forbes and
igobon (FRC) correlation tests, the DFGM regression test and the
R test for the detection of contagion for our three components
global banking, domestic banking and NFCs). One problem which9 The Forbes Rigobon (FR) test relies on a Fisher-corrected standard error whereas 
he DFGM method has statistical significance directly from the regression. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics. 
Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: Banking stock returns 
Austria 0.0041 2.2638 −0.185 5.2985 
Belgium −0.0035 2.6652 −0.4309 9.7803 
Finland 0.0566 2.136 0.1575 10.4334 
France 0.0114 2.2865 0.3087 7.6767 
Germany −0.0113 2.0258 −0.0379 11.2752 
Greece −0.1378 3.3755 0.0060 7.6254 
Ireland −0.0842 4.3709 −1.45 37.572 
Italy −0.002 2.1109 −0.1161 4.7339 
Netherlands −0.0393 2.2532 −4.7409 99.1813 
Portugal −0.0535 2.1532 0.0944 6.1827 
Spain 0.0178 1.9542 0.4462 9.8685 
UK −0.0094 1.9341 −0.1112 15.3589 
US −0.0019 2.3739 0.1347 17.3561 
Panel B: Non-financial stock returns 
Austria 0.0337 1.2316 −0.4276 6.6764 
Belgium 0.0594 1.0535 −0.3320 4.4304 
Finland 0.0227 1.4779 −0.1834 4.8460 
France 0.033 1.1673 0.0347 8.2581 
Germany 0.0402 1.2022 1.0284 28.9875 
Greece 0.0053 1.5269 −0.2143 5.0090 
Ireland 0.0402 1.2869 −0.7909 6.8867 
Italy 0.0239 1.2408 −0.1187 7.1506 
Netherlands 0.0346 1.1815 −0.4429 8.5255 
Portugal 0.0237 1.133 −0.21681 10.0376 
Spain 0.0378 1.1831 −0.1031 5.8661 
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics for all the sectoral 
returns used in the study. 
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r  hese tests are not specifically designed for is to test using non-
ontinguous data, where markets may move in and out of crisis
nd calm states across the sample. In our application, we filter data
nto each of the two sample periods, as described in the results
ection. 
.3. Estimating the MS-FAVAR 
We estimate a three-variable VAR model in a Markov-switching
ramework for each country. For country i , we include the external
anking shock (described above) and shocks to the returns of the
omestic banking and non-financial sectors. We specify the depen-
ent vector of variables for country i as ; 10 
 i,t = { global factor , bank shoc k i , NFC shoc k i } t . 
The shocks to the domestic returns are proxied by the residuals
rom a first order VAR model with exogenous variables included to
apture global stock market and liquidity conditions. For country i ,
he model can be written as: 
 j,t = α j + ρr j,t−1 + 
1 ∑ 
k =0 
β jk r w,t−k + 
1 ∑ 
k =0 
γ jk T E D t−k + ξ j,t (1)
here r j ( j = banks, non-financials), r w and TED represent the
ectoral returns, the market portfolio returns and the change in liq-
idity respectively. 11 
We then proceed to estimate the following MS-FAVAR model: 
 i,t = λ( s t ) + 
p ∑ 
1 
θp ( s t ) y i,t−p + ε st i,t (2) 
 t ∈ { 1 , 2 } 
 
st 
i,t ∼ i.i.d. 
(
0 , σ 2 s 
)
here y i,t is the 3 ×1 vector defined above. The regression con-
tant ( λ), the matrix of autoregressive coefficients ( θ ) and the co-
ariance matrix of residuals ( σ ) are all regime-dependent. S t is
he unobservable latent variable governing the regime path, which
akes a value of unity in ‘normal’ market conditions (low asset
olatility) and a value of 2 in ‘crisis’ (high-volatility) episodes.
ollowing the regime-switching literature, the regime paths are
arkov switching and are endogenously determined. The condi-
ional probabilities of remaining in the same state are defined as
ollows 12 : 
r [ S t = 1 | S t−1 = 1 ] = p 11 
r [ S t = 2 | S t−1 = 2 ] = p 22 . (3) 
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte
arlo (MCMC) approach. We first specify the prior distributions for
he parameters. For the variances, we employ a Wishart distribu-
ion, the VAR coefficients have a flat prior and we use a weak
irichlet prior for the transitions, with a preference towards re-
aining in the same state. Using Gibbs sampling, we estimate the
arameters and regimes in the following sequence; 
Step 1: We draw the sigmas, given the mean coefficients and
regimes. 10 Since we analyze the GIRFs, the ordering of the variables does not matter in 
pecification of the VAR. 
11 The TED spread is the difference between the interest rate on interbank loans 
nd short-term U.S. Treasury bills. It is an often-used proxy for market liquidity. 
12 We also investigated the possibility of estimating a time-varying transition 
robability model (TVP) using US lagged bank returns and time as the informa- 
ion variables. However, there was little difference between their estimated proba- 
ilities and those from the fixed transition model (FTP) (correlations between the 
stimated probabilities were always greater than 0.93 and often as large as 0.99) so 
e choose to work with the FTP specification. 
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(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 Step 2: We draw the mean coefficients ( λ and θ) given sigmas
and regimes. 
Step 3: We draw the regimes, given the sigmas and mean coef-
ficients. 
Step 4: We draw the transition parameters. 
This sequence of steps is repeated 10,0 0 0 times after dis-
arding an initial ‘burn-in’ set of 2,0 0 0 replications. Once we
ave obtained our estimated parameters, we generate the regime-
ependent GIRFs and their associated confidence bands. We inter-
ret a statistically significant increase in the response of variable
 to a shock to variable i in the crisis regime as contagion from i
o j . On the other hand, a statistically significant decrease consti-
utes decoupling. If the IRF is unchanged between regimes, this is
nterdependence. 
. Data 
Our data consists of daily stock returns for the banking and NFC
ectors of eleven Eurozone countries plus the UK and the US. The
K and the US are included to give broad coverage of external
or non-Eurozone) events that potentially exerted common shocks
hroughout the global banking system. All data are Datastream-
onstructed indices to represent the sectors under investigation.
he mnemonics have the form BANKS + CC (for the banking sec-
or) and TOTLI + CC (for the non-financial sector) where CC rep-
esents the country-specific suffix. The full set of countries ana-
yzed are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
and, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US.
hen identifying domestic shocks, we proxy for developments in
lobal stock markets and funding / liquidity markets by includ-
ng a Datastream-constructed world market portfolio (TOTMKWD)
nd the TED spread respectively. The latter is obtained from the
atabase of the Federal Reserve Board. Our sample begins on Jan-
ary 1, 2004 and runs until March 31, 2015. The starting point
s chosen to avoid contamination with earlier crises such as the
ursting of the Dot.com bubble or the collapse of the LTCM hedgeous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Table 2 
Details of model and regimes. 
Percentage of variance 
explained by 1st PC 
No of lags in MS-VAR Normal Regime p 11 Crisis regime p 22 Duration of crisis regime Frequency of crisis 
Austria 50.42 1 0.962 0.875 8.0 23.3 
Belgium 49.02 1 0.940 0.897 9.8 36.4 
Finland 51.89 1 0.929 0.812 5.3 27.4 
France 47.99 2 0.974 0.911 11.2 22.6 
Germany 48.97 2 0.964 0.849 6.6 19.3 
Greece 53.20 1 0.918 0.927 13.7 52.9 
Ireland 52.33 2 0.933 0.857 7.0 31.9 
Italy 48.64 1 0.938 0.880 8.3 34.2 
Netherlands 53.27 1 0.931 0.870 7.8 34.8 
Portugal 51.50 1 0.902 0.878 8.2 44.5 
Spain 48.80 1 0.958 0.901 10.1 29.8 
Notes: We present information on our model specification and the frequency and persistence of regimes. Column 2 reports the proportion of the variance of banking stocks 
in the UK and the US plus the other ‘n- 1 ′ Eurozone countries that is explained by our global factor. Column 3 tells us the number of lags included in the MS-FAVAR model. 
Columns 4 and 5 present the probabilities of remaining in the ‘normal’ (p 11 ) and ‘crisis’ (p 22 ) regimes respectively, given that you began the period in that regime. The 
probability of moving to the other state is 1 – p ii . Columns 6 and 7 presents statistics about the regimes. Frequency measures the proportion of time that each country 
spends in the ‘crisis’ regime, while Duration measures the length of time (in days) for which the shock persists. Frequency and Duration are calculated as (1-p 11 )/(2-p 11 -p 22 ) 
and 1/(1-p22) respectively with p 11 and p 22 as defined in Eq. (3) . 
Table 3 
Regime-specific correlations. 
Global bank factor & domestic banks Global bank factor & domestic NFCs Domestic banks & domestic NFCs 
Normal Crisis Normal Crisis Normal Crisis 
Austria 0.506 0.505 0.359 0.399 0.451 0.546 
Belgium 0.482 0.559 0.354 0.313 0.402 0.293 
Finland 0.356 0.450 0.364 0.299 0.391 0.383 
France 0.659 0.610 0.494 0.380 0.631 0.524 
Germany 0.519 0.536 0.442 0.202 0.558 0.247 
Greece 0.199 0.228 0.172 0.240 0.653 0.616 
Ireland 0.392 0.342 0.335 0.332 0.402 0.242 
Italy 0.548 0.568 0.463 0.446 0.630 0.658 
Netherlands 0.348 0.142 0.394 0.428 0.428 0.171 
Portugal 0.319 0.415 0.217 0.411 0.474 0.467 
Spain 0.602 0.523 0.524 0.451 0.764 0.722 
Notes: This presents the regime-dependent pairwise correlations generated by our MS-FAVAR model. 
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13 The global factor is highly correlated across countries. The first eigenvalue ex- 
plains about 99% of the cross-sectional variation. Therefore, the global factor is es- fund. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables em-
ployed in the analysis. 
Panels A and B of Table 1 refer to banking sector and NFC
stock returns respectively. There are striking differences between
the bank returns and those on the non-financial sectors. The mean
return on NFCs is positive in every country, while returns to bank-
ing stocks are, on average, negative for nine of the thirteen coun-
tries in our sample. Finland records the highest average daily re-
turn while Irish and Greek banks have the largest negative returns.
In fact, Finland is the only country whose banking stocks record a
higher mean return than their NFC counterparts over the period.
Banking stocks are also more risky, with a higher standard devia-
tion compared to the NFCs in every country. Among the Eurozone
countries, particularly high levels of risk are observed in states
where banks had to be bailed out by domestic governments such
as Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece. Spain is an ex-
ception since it was predominantly a large number of small banks
that required state support, while the larger banks performed rel-
atively well. Non-financial firms in Belgium performed particularly
well over the sample, recording the highest average return and the
lowest standard deviation of return. Greek NFCs have the small-
est mean and largest risk measure. Furthermore, all returns (for
both sectors) exhibit skewness and strong evidence of kurtosis. The
prevalence of fat tails suggests that modeling these returns in a
Markov-switching framework may be better than in a single state
setting. 
To aid in the explanation of our results, we source data on bank
sector credit (Table F2_4) and total credit (Table F2_2) to the pri-
vate non-financial sector for all countries from the Bank of Interna-
s
Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ional Settlements (BIS). We also use the BIS consolidated banking
tatistics (Table b4) to construct a regional breakdown of the for-
ign claims of the banking sector in each of our countries. Claims
re computed on an ultimate risk basis. 
. Discussion of results 
.1. Results of the MS-FAVAR model 
Table 2 presents an overview of the MS-FAVAR model specifica-
ion and some statistics for the identified regimes in each country.
Firstly, the global or common banking factor extracted in the
rincipal components analysis represents about 50% of the total
ariation in banking stocks across the sector. It varies from a low
f 48% in the model for France to a high of 53% in the specifica-
ions for Greece and the Netherlands. 13 Initially, the number of lags
ncluded in the country-specific MS-FAVAR is selected using the
annan-Quinn information criterion. After estimation, we check for
esidual autocorrelation in the expected residuals and where this is
ound, we proceed to add lags to the VAR until the final lag is no
onger statistically significant in any of the estimated equations. 
We report the ‘Frequency’ and ‘Duration’ statistics for the high-
olatility regime in Table 2 . The transition probabilities for each
f the countries support the hypothesis that generally the mod-
ls have high probability of remaining in either the crisis or calmentially the same in each country analysis. 
ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Table 4 
Correlation-based tests of contagion. 
Global to domestic banks Domestic banks to global NFC to global 
FR N FR C DFGM DR FR N FR C DFGM DR FR N FR C DFGM DR 
Austria I C I D I D C I I D C I 
Belgium C D C I C D C I I D C I 
Finland C D C D C D C I I D I I 
France D D C D D D C I D D D I 
Germany I D I D I D C I D D I I 
Greece I D C C I D C I C D I I 
Ireland I D C I I D I I I D C I 
Italy I D C D I D C I I D I I 
Netherlands D D D I D D I I I D C I 
Portugal C D C D C D C I C I C I 
Spain D D I D D D C I D D I I 
Global to NFC Domestic Banks to NFC NFC to Domestic Banks 
Austria I C I C C D D I C D I D 
Belgium I D I C D D D C D D D I 
Finland I D D D I D I C I D C I 
France D D D I D D D C D D C C 
Germany D D D C D D D I D D I D 
Greece C D D C D D D C D D C D 
Ireland I D I C D D D C D D I I 
Italy I D D D C D D C C D C D 
Netherlands I D I C D D D I D D D I 
Portugal C I I D I D D C I D C C 
Spain D D I D D D D D D D C C 
Notes: This Table reports the results from the existing correlation-based tests. FRN and FRC refer to the uncor- 
rected and corrected Forbes-Rigobon (2002) test, DFGM is the regression-based test of Dungey et al. (2005) , and 
DR refers to the test of Dungey and Renault (2018) . ‘C’, ‘I’ and ‘D’ represent ‘contagion’, ‘interdependence’ and 
‘de-coupling’, respectively. 
m  
t  
a  
t  
t  
a  
o  
w  
p  
(  
I  
c  
t  
c  
a  
b  
t
5
 
t  
t  
t  
c
 
i  
s  
e
t  
S  
d  
l  
b  
I  
l  
c  
i
 
a  
c  
d
 
d  
e  
r  
r  
a  
l  
f  
i  
s
5
 
t  
t  
t  
t  
f  
a  
s  
T  
fi  
c  
i  
t  
b  
i  
s  
i  odes, and relatively low probability of transitioning between
hese states. The calm regime is the more persistent and has, on
verage across countries, a less than 6% chance of transiting to
he crisis regime. ‘Frequency’ measures the proportion of the time
hat the system spends in the ‘crisis’ regime. It varies substantially
cross countries, with Greece being in this high-volatility state for
ver half the sample (53%). Portugal also suffers a prolonged crisis
ith the turbulent regime prevailing for almost 45% of the sam-
le. Next, there is a club of countries who spend roughly one-third
30% −36%) of the time in a crisis state, and this includes Belgium,
reland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. At the other extreme, the
ountry for which the crisis is least common is Germany, with less
han 20% of the time spent in the high-volatility regime. ‘Duration’
aptures the persistence of the high-volatility shock. On average,
cross countries, a high-volatility shock persists for nearly 9 days
ut ranges from 5 days in the case of Finland to almost 14 days in
he model for Greece. 
.2. Conditional correlations 
Next, we analyze the regime-specific correlations, generated by
he MS-FAVAR, for each pair of variables. Although not a statistical
est for the stability of relationships, they provide an overview of
he comovement changes between regimes. Table 3 presents the
orrelations. 
Firstly, we focus on the relationship between the global bank-
ng factor and returns on the domestic banking sector. We ob-
erve great heterogeneity across countries, with six (five) countries
xhibiting increased (decreased) comovement. Interestingly, coun- 
ries whose domestic banks suffered large declines, such as Ireland,
pain, and the Netherlands, appear to become more idiosyncratic
uring the crisis. The largest change is recorded for the Nether-
ands and appears to be driven by a large downward jump in the
anking index, coinciding with the Dutch government bailout of
NG in October 2008. While Greece exhibits an increase in corre-
ation in the crisis regime, it is noteworthy that it is much lessPlease cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 orrelated with the global factor than any of its Eurozone partners
n both states. 
The change in correlation between the global banking factor
nd domestic NFCs shows similar dispersion and heterogeneity. No
lear pattern emerges, but results suggest that for most countries
omestic NFCs decouple from the global banking industry. 
Finally, we turn to the regime-specific comovements of the
omestic banking and NFC sectors. Here a much clearer pattern
merges, with the vast bulk of countries showing a decline in cor-
elation as we move from ‘normal’ market conditions to the ‘crisis’
egime. The relatively lower levels of comovement during the crisis
re especially evident for Germany and the Netherlands. This pre-
iminary investigation offers comfort to investors in country port-
olios in that it suggests that adverse shocks to a country’s bank-
ng sector can be diversified away to some degree by holding the
tocks of NFCs from that same country. 
.3. Existing contagion tests 
In Table 4 we present the results of testing for contagion, in-
erdependence and decoupling, using the FRN, FRC, DFGM and DR
ests, between the global banking, domestic banking and NFC sec-
ors in each country. In each case the usual mixed evidence for
he existence of contagion or otherwise is evident across the dif-
erent tests. For example, the comparison of results from the FRN
nd FRC show that the corrected tests always find evidence con-
istent with reduced shock transmission during the crisis period.
hat is, where FRN finds contagion (interdependence), FRC tends to
nd interdependence (decoupling) after adjusting for the volatility
hanges. This is evident for all types of shocks. Shocks originat-
ng in the global banking sector provide mixed evidence across the
ests. In the DFGM test these shocks are contagious to domestic
anks, but not to the NFC sector, whereas in the DR test this find-
ng is reversed. Both global banking shocks and domestic banking
hocks are most frequently contagious to the non-financial sector
n the DR test, but show little evidence of this in the DFGM test.ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 1. Response of NFC to Global Bank Shock. 
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DResults are more consistent for the transmission of NFC shocks to
the banking sector across countries in that they show little evi-
dence of decoupling. Rather, they are mainly associated with in-
terdependence or contagion effects. In the DR results, the effects
are mainly attributed to interdependence, but in the regression ap-
proach of DFGM there is more evidence of contagion. 
These mixed results are indicative of the state of the contagion
literature. There are many tests and understanding how they fit
together is critical to interpreting their results as they all tackle
slightly different aspects of the problem. The usual result of the
FRC detecting less increase (more decrease) in transmission be-Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ween a normal and crisis period is apparent. The DFGM approach
ontrols for the change in unconditional volatility between nor-
al and crisis periods with stronger statistical properties than the
orrelation-based tests. It tends to find more evidence of increased
ransmission than FRC (i.e., more contagion and less decoupling).
inally, the DR test, which controls for the relative change in id-
osyncratic variances using conditional variances, provides a view
hich is between the FRC and DFGM outcomes – with more ev-
dence of contagion and interdependence than FRC but less than
FGM. ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 2. Response of NFCs to Domestic Bank Shock. 
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sThese tests have a number of disadvantages that can be over-
ome with our MS-FAVAR approach. These include first, that the
ivariate tests are not set up to deal with non-contiguous data
pecifically, so that distortions may arise when using lagged values,
articularly in the conditional variance test. Second, the tests are
ot embedded in the multivariate nature of the model, but rather
ely on the extracted shocks. Third, we have to choose an arbitrary
hreshold to classify the shocks into those associated with calmt
r
Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 nd crisis – here p = 0.60. 14 Instead, we progress to the MS-FAVAR
pproach that produces clearly defined regimes endogenously for
ach economy and allows us to conduct tests based on the dif-
erences between the dynamics of the adjustment process of one
ector in response to shocks to another across the two regimes. 14 In practice there is little sensitivity to this choice for our outcomes, however 
his in itself is perhaps not a recommendation (we tested with p = 0.95, p = 0.20 for 
obustness). 
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Fig. 3. Ratio of Bank to Total Credit used by Non-Banking Private Firms by country. 
Notes: This figure is constructed from the BIS data on Bank sector credit to non-financial private sector (Table F2_4) and Total credit to non-financial private sector (Table 
F2_2). It shows the ratio of Bank to Total credit from 2 years, 2006 (pre-crisis) and 2015 (end of sample). 
Table 5 
Summary of contemporaneous responses from GIRFs. 
Global to Domestic banks to Non-financials to 
dom banks NFCs global bank NFCs global dom banks 
Austria D I C I C C 
Belgium C D D I C I 
Finland C D I D I C 
France I D I D I C 
Germany I D I D D D 
Greece C I I D C C 
Ireland C D D D C I 
Italy I D C D C C 
Netherlands D D D D C D 
Portugal C C I D C C 
Spain D D I D C C 
Notes: This Table summarises the information from the regime-dependent GIRFs for the 
transmission of shocks. ‘C’, ‘I’ and ‘D’ represent ‘contagion’, ‘interdependence’ and ‘decou- 
pling’, respectively. 
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t  5.4. Impulse response functions 
To test the hypothesis outlined in Section 2 , we generate
regime-dependent GIRFs for each of the estimated models and an-
alyze the stability of market linkages between the two regimes.
The figures that follow contain the GIRFs, with 95% confidence
bands, of the response of a given market to a shock in another,
in both the crisis and non-crisis periods for each country. Table 5
presents a summary of whether the contemporaneous response
from one shock type to another represents evidence of contagion,
interdependence or decoupling based on the comparison of the
point estimates with 95% confidence bands. 
5.4.1. NFC response to banking shocks 
Figs. 1 and 2 show the responses of the NFC sector to global
and domestic banking shocks respectively. In both cases and across
all countries, the NFC response to a banking shock is positive
(same direction) in the ‘normal’ regime and, in both regimes, the
NFC sectors are more sensitive to domestic as opposed to exter-
nal banking disturbances. For example, in the normal regime the
contemporaneous reaction of the domestic NFC sector to a global
banking shock results in a spillover of about 3% on average acrossPlease cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ountries, whereas the equivalent number for a domestic banking
hock is about 27%. This suggests that NFCs rely more on domes-
ic banks for intermediated loans and it may be that the global
hocks, only indirectly affect domestic NFCs through their impact
n the domestic banking sector. 
Strikingly, during periods of stress, there is little evidence of
ontagion from the banking shocks to the NFC sector. Their impact
n the NFC sector is usually better described as interdependence
r decoupling. In fact, decoupling is the predominant outcome in
he transmission of both global and domestic banking stocks, sug-
esting that there is reduced sensitivity to banking shocks among
urozone NFCs. This finding is consistent with Laeven and Valen-
ia (2013b), Bekaert et al. (2014) and Dungey et al. (2018) who at-
ribute this partly to the success of government interventions in
disconnecting’ banks from the real economy during the crisis. 
Blatt et al. (2015) show that changes to market linkages may
ot always be immediate following a shock and show that changes
o the dynamics of relationships can often occur without a contem-
oraneous effect. Our methodology allows us to detect these types
f changes. In this application, shocks tend to die out quickly and
here is little change in the dynamics. However, for the case of the
ransmission of domestic shocks to NFCs ( Fig. 2 ), we find less per-ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 4. Response of Domestic Banks to Global Bank Shock. 
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t  istence in Finland, Italy and Portugal to reinforce the contempora-
eous decoupling result, while only for Belgium is there evidence
f the weaker linkage being offset by greater persistence. The rela-
ionship dynamics are unchanged in all other countries. 
Our decoupling results indicate that Eurozone NFCs were able
o overcome credit flow restrictions during the banking crisis. This
s consistent with U.S. studies that show that NFCs were able to
eplace bank loans by sourcing direct financing on bond markets
e.g. Adrian et al., 2012 ; and Becker and Ivashina, 2014 ). Pre-crisis,
uropean corporate bond markets were not very well developed,Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 .g. Ciccarelli et al. (2015) estimate that about 70% of the exter-
al funding of European firms comes from banks (versus about
0% in the U.S.). However, Kaya and Wang (2016) and Deutsche
ank (2013) both document a deepening of European bond mar-
ets and increased bond issuance by European firms during the
risis. 
We use BIS data to look for changes in the composition of NFC
ebt across our sampled countries. In particular, we analyse the to-
al credit used by non-banking private sector firms and the propor-
ion of it sourced from banks. For all countries, except Finland, to-ous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 5. Regional Breakdown of Foreign Claims as at 31.12.2006. 
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t  tal credit employed in the NFC sector has declined and, in general,
bank debt has dropped more quickly. Fig. 3 presents a summary,
comparing the proportion of NFC debt sourced from banks in the
pre-crisis year of 2006 15 with that in the final year of our sample,
2015. For most countries, the ratio of bank to total credit declines,
spectacularly in the case of Ireland with a fall of 43 percentage
points. Double-digit reductions are also recorded in Belgium and
Spain (12 and 11 percentage points respectively). Only two coun-
tries – Greece and Italy – show modest increases of 1 percentage
point each. For both countries, total private sector credit (and the
bank to total credit) peaked later in the sample. Therefore, the suc-
cess of firms in sourcing alternative direct sources of debt to re-
place the restricted credit from the banking industry, appears to
have been a key factor in the decoupling of the NFC sectors from
the global and domestic banks. 
Our results are remarkably robust across countries given the
large differences in industrial composition of the non-financial sec-
tors across Eurozone stock markets. Therefore diversifying a coun-
try portfolio between these two sectors will help offset some of
the banking risk through the observed de-coupling of sectors. NFC
stocks prove to have better diversification benefits than might have
been anticipated from pre-crisis linkages. Of course, all our NFCs
are relatively large, exchange-listed firms and it may have been
smaller, private firms that bore the brunt of the banking credit15 We use 2006 to be consistent with our earlier choice of pre-crisis year but, 
in fact, total private sector credit in most Euro zone countries did not peak until 
around 2008 or 2009. 
t  
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s
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Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ontraction, 16 but notwithstanding, the decoupling result shows
hat some of the banking shocks (global and domestic) may have
een hedged by holding domestic NFC stocks. 
.4.2. Transmission of shocks within the banking industry 
Fig. 4 shows the response of the domestic banking sector to a
lobal banking shock. During ‘normal’ market conditions, the do-
estic banking sectors of all countries react positively, i.e. in the
ame direction, to a global banking shock. However, the response
s relatively muted and ranges from 0.04 to 0.08. As we move to a
crisis’ episode, the shock transmission for largest banking sectors
f Italy, Germany and France remains unchanged (i.e. interdepen-
ence). Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Finland and Belgium, all of which
ad significant problems in their banking sector over this period,
xperienced contagion whereby shocks in the global banking sec-
or were more strongly felt in the domestic banking sectors for
hese markets. This is particularly strong in Ireland (an increase of
 percentage points), with the Irish banking sector being more sen-
itive to world banking conditions than the other countries. This is
onsistent with the fact that the growth of Irish banks was fueled
y an increasing reliance on interbank markets for funds over the
eriod ( Connor et al., 2012 ). Finally, the banking sectors of Aus-
ria, the Netherlands and Spain become less sensitive to, and thus
end to decouple from, global events during the crisis. The scale of
he changes in the decoupling case is relatively small – declines of16 Both Casey and O’Toole (2014) and Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) show that 
maller firms relied more on trade credit than direct loans to offset the effects of 
redit rationing. 
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Fig. 6. Response of Global Banking Sector to Domestic Bank Shock. 
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p  .2, 2.2 and 1.8 percentage points respectively – so that they are
conomically small, but statistically significant. Our results confirm
he existence of the international transmission of banking conta-
ion as reported in Dungey and Gajurel (2015) . In both studies,
rance and Italy exhibit interdependence to common shocks, while
oth Spain and the Netherlands become less responsive during a
risis period. 
The dynamics of the relationship change between normal and
risis conditions for many countries. Contagion effects are com-
ounded by increased shock persistence in Belgium, Greece andPlease cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ortugal. Though showing no immediate change between regimes,
rance and Italy also exhibit increased persistence during the cri-
is, while for Austria, the benefits of decoupling are partially offset
y increased persistence of the shock. In summary, only Germany
interdependence), Spain and the Netherlands (decoupling) avoid
nanticipated negative repercussions from the global factor during
 crisis. 
To shed more light on the decoupling result, we analyse the
re-crisis non-domestic assets of the banks across our sampledous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 7. Response of Global Banking Sector to NFC Shock. 
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a  countries. 17 Fig. 5 presents regional breakdowns of the foreign
claims for the domestic banks of each country at the end of De-
cember 2006, 18 before a banking crisis began to emerge in any
country. In countries where the domestic sector decoupled from
the global banking shock – Spain, Netherlands and Austria – we17 Ideally, we would like to also have the domestic exposures but this data is not 
available pre-crisis. The BIS and ECB have begun to report this data starting in 2013 
Q4. 
18 There is no pre-crisis data available for Italy and Finland so we present results 
for the other nine countries. 
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(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ote that they had a significant exposure to developing markets.
or example, Spain had the largest absolute exposure and ac-
ounted for 21% of the claims from this set of Euro zone countries,
hile Austria and the Netherlands account for 15% each. A deeper
nalysis reveals that the Spanish exposure was mainly to the bet-
er performing countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; Aus-
ria to Emerging Europe; while Dutch banks’ developing-country
xposure was well diversified across three regions, Latin Ameri-
an and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, and Europe. Furthermore,
utch banks were the only group to have a significant exposure toous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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Fig. 8. Response of Domestic Banks to NFC Shock. 
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p  ustralia and Canada (two developed countries which evaded the
orst of the banking crisis), accounting for a further 5% of their
oreign claims. Therefore, the decoupling of these markets from the
lobal factor may be explained, at least in part, by their revenues
enerated from assets in developing countries that continued to
erform well during the global financial crisis. 
All remaining countries have concentrated their developing
ortfolios in Europe and even though it accounts for a large pro-
ortion of Greek and Portuguese foreign claims, the absolute size
f their foreign positions is small, accounting for only 3% and 2%
f the total Euro zone exposures to developing countries respec-Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 ively. It is also likely that the magnitude of their domestic prob-
ems swamped the benefits accruing from this form of diversifica-
ion. 
Fig. 6 captures the feedback effects of domestic banking shocks
o the global banking sector. While there is evidence of contagion
eedback to the global banking sector from Austria and Italy, for
he majority of the countries domestically sourced banking shocks
licit the same global banking sector response in normal and crisis
eriods, i.e. there is only evidence of interdependence. The excep-
ions are for Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium where decou-
ling occurs, though the effect for Ireland and Belgium is partiallyous? Evidence from the eurozone, Journal of Banking and Finance 
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c  undone by greater, but short-lived, persistence. This may reflect
that the policy adjustments undertaken in these three markets
by their domestic governments to recapitalize their banking sec-
tor were the most concerted of those for the countries examined.
Other countries where banking crises were domestically important,
such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, relied to a much greater extent
on programs facilitated by the European Central Bank and the IMF.
5.4.3. The response of the banking industry to NFC shocks 
Figs. 7 and 8 present the GIRFs for the global and domestic
banking response respectively to a shock sourced in the NFC sec-
tor. There is strong evidence that, in many countries, these shocks
feedback to both the domestic and global banking sectors as con-
tagion. It appears that any negative shocks suffered by NFCs fur-
ther exacerbated the already stressed position of the banking in-
dustry during the crisis period. This is consistent with the models
of Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in which
shocks in the NFC sector cause problems for the banking sector
via a robust–but–fragile effect apparent during periods of stress.
NFC shocks in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain all result in
contagion to both their domestic and global banking sectors. These
are the so-called GIIPS countries at the heart of the 2010–12 Euro-
pean crisis. The Netherlands and Austria also generated contagion
from NFC shocks to the global banking sector. With the exception
of Germany, which acted as a safe haven market during this cri-
sis, interdependence characterizes the transmission of NFC shocks
to the global banking sector during the crisis period in each of the
other markets. The decoupling of German markets from other Eu-
ropean markets is also apparent in Dungey and Renault (2018) . The
dynamics of the responses are largely unaffected by the transition
to a crisis regime, though both Finland and the Netherlands show
a quicker reversal of the shock. 
The evidence of changing transmission between NFC shocks and
the domestic banking sector differs for Finland, Ireland and the
Netherlands from the effects of these shocks on global banking
sector. In Finland, NFC shocks are contagious to the domestic bank-
ing sector. Finland weathered the events of 2008–2010 relatively
well, but has since faced considerable domestic problems due to
falling exports and rising labour costs. While the financial sector
in Finland is well regulated and adequate credit is available (OECD
Economic Surveys: Finland 2014), the majority of wholesale funds
are sourced from other Nordic markets so that the domestic sector
alone is relatively small. Consequently, the contagion effects of the
NFC shocks represent the impact of the reduction in competitive-
ness in the Finnish economy on those banks, which are located
in the Finnish domestic banking sector according to the Datas-
tream index selection conditions. In Ireland and the Netherlands,
the propagation of NFC shocks to the domestic banking sector re-
mains unchanged between the calm and crisis periods in terms of
the initial impact. In addition, Ireland exhibits a stronger reversal
of the initial shock in the crisis regime. This may be attributable
to the policy actions of these two countries, where actions were
taken rapidly to address the re-capitalization of the banking sec-
tor, improve banking supervision and foster a market perception of
credible movement towards macroeconomic sustainability. 
6. Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results by estimating a range
of alternatively specified models. Firstly, we investigate the im-
pact of adding an extra variable to our MS-FAVAR model. 19 We in-
clude the second principal component as an extra regressor and,19 All of the results of these robustness checks are available in a set of (unpub- 
lished) ancillary results to the paper. This document is available at [to be inserted]. 
m  
o
Please cite this article as: M. Dungey et al., Are banking shocks contagi
(2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.07.010 n a separate specification, we include a pure U.S. factor. The lat-
er results from orthogonalizing the U.S. bank sector return with
espect to the first principal component. In both specifications, the
esults of Table 5 regarding contagion, interdependence and decou-
ling prove to be robust in the vast majority of cases. Contagion
s limited to within the banking industry and there is widespread
vidence of decoupling of domestic NFCs from both global and do-
estic banks. There are some changes to the dynamics (mainly due
o different lag lengths being selected) but these have a relatively
mall impact and quickly die out of the system. 
Secondly, we deal with the fact that our global banking factor
s a generated variable and may cause some biases in the estima-
ion. We follow Connor and Korajczyk (1986) who show that as
he number of cross-sectional units grows, the extracted factor be-
omes a consistent estimator of the true factor. Thus, we repeat
ur analysis with the number of country banking sector returns
xtended to 50 20 (13 in the earlier results). We use the first princi-
al component from this exercise as our global banking factor and
roceed as before. Again, a robust picture emerges from the analy-
is and our conclusions are unchanged regarding the incidences of
ontagion, interdependence and decoupling. Again, there are some
hanges to the dynamics but shocks have little persistence. 
. Conclusions 
We assess the impact of shocks transmitted between the global
anking sector, domestic banking sector and the non-financial sec-
or for eleven Eurozone countries over the period 2004–2015. Us-
ng an MS-FAVAR model we endogenize the identification of peri-
ds of normality and crisis in each market and use these to test
hether the transmission of shocks between the global banking,
omestic banking and non-financial sectors is altered between nor-
al and crisis periods. That is, we test whether transmission is un-
hanged, increased or decreased, consistent with integration, con-
agion and decoupling effects in the markets. 
We find that while global banking shocks generate contagious
ffects for the domestic banking sectors for a substantial number
f countries but there are relatively few instances when domestic
anking shocks generate contagion for the global market. In gen-
ral, the transmission of shocks from domestic banks to the global
anking sector is unchanged between normal and crisis times, con-
istent with interdependence (and even provides evidence of de-
oupling for Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium). 
We found little evidence of contagion from banking shocks to
he non-financial sector. In most cases, NFCs managed to decouple
rom both global and domestic banks during the financial turmoil.
ven though, NFCs are far more sensitive to domestic bank shocks
n both regimes, they still succeeded in lowering their responses
uring the crisis by about 38% on average across all countries. One
ould argue that this was due to the policies implemented dur-
ng the crisis, and though they may have helped to cushion the
hock, it is unlikely to be the whole story. This result is broadly
imilar across all Eurozone countries, even though the extent (and
ypes) of government support for their domestic banking sectors
aried widely (see Laeven and Valencia, 2013a ). It seems that non-
nancial firms were able to access alternative funding sources and
ubstitute bank loans with direct loans on the corporate bond mar-
ets. Corporate bond markets continued to function and supply
unds to creditworthy NFCs. This is encouraging for the adoption
f policies that strive to develop such bond markets within the EU.
ffort s to keep credit flowing in the domestic economies during
rises may benefit from policies aimed at deepening and develop-
ent of corporate bond markets and / or reducing barriers for NFC20 We include all countries for which Datastream has data on their banking sectors 
ver our sample period of January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2015. 
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R  rms in accessing these markets, e.g. reducing costs of attaining a
redit rating by either direct support or tax write-offs. 21 
Finally, we find strong evidence that non-financial sector shocks
ropagate contagion to the domestic and global banking sectors
uring the crisis periods. The transmission of non-financial sector
hocks to the banking sectors is statistically larger during the cri-
is period than the normal period. For GIIPS countries this effect is
ronounced for contagion from the non-financial sector to global
anking markets, but the results for the transmission to domestic
anking sectors is more mixed. 
Banks with better diversified asset bases fared better during the
risis as they were able to decouple from global banking condi-
ions. Larger exposure to emerging markets enabled the banks of
ustria, Spain and the Netherlands to offset some of the global tur-
oil. Greater disclosure of banks’ aggregate asset exposures by ge-
graphical area and distinction between non-financial and financial
ectors should be encouraged so that investors and regulators can
etter assess their vulnerability to shocks. 
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